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Abstract
Many web applications are vulnerable to session hi-
jacking attacks due to the insecure use of cookies for
session management. The most recommended defense
against this threat is to completely replace HTTP with
HTTPS. However, this approach presents several chal-
lenges (e.g., performance and compatibility concerns)
and therefore, has not been widely adopted. In this pa-
per, we propose “One-Time Cookies” (OTC), an HTTP
session authentication protocol that is efficient, easy to
deploy and resistant to session hijacking. OTC’s secu-
rity relies on the use of disposable credentials based on
a modified hash chain construction. We implemented
OTC as a plug-in for the popular WordPress platform
and conducted extensive performance analysis using ex-
tensions developed for both Firefox and Firefox for mo-
bile browsers. Our experiments demonstrate the ability
to maintain session integrity with a throughput improve-
ment of 51% over HTTPS and a performance approx-
imately similar to a cookie-based approach. In so do-
ing, we demonstrate that one-time cookies can signifi-
cantly improve the security of web sessions with minimal
changes to current infrastructure.
1 Introduction
HTTP is a stateless protocol. Requests to a web server
are treated as independent transactions with no relation
to each other. While simple and scalable, this design
makes the creation of applications requiring the associa-
tion of multiple transactions to a single user (e.g., bank-
ing) somewhat difficult natively. HTTP cookies, which
generally contain one or a small number of short identi-
fier strings allowing a server to associate seemingly unre-
lated requests, rapidly became the dominant mechanism
for web session management.
Unfortunately, the use of cookies introduces a num-
ber of security risks, especially when they are employed
as session authentication tokens. As an example, many
websites rely on strong security mechanisms such as
HTTPS (i.e., HTTP over TLS/SSL) to initially authenti-
cate a user. During this secure session, the server gener-
ates cookies that the user can later employ as lightweight
authentication tokens. However, because these tokens
are static and transmitted “in the clear”, an adversary able
to intercept them can use these cookies to gain unau-
thorized access to a user’s session. While such session
hijacking attacks are not new, a significant number of
web applications remains vulnerable to this threat [38].
Moreover, the availability of tools such as Hamster [14]
and Firesheep [6] makes such attacks simple to execute.
While the common wisdom suggests the extension of
HTTPS from login to site-wide protection, this solution
may break certain web application functionality [34] and
impact performance. Accordingly, lightweight solutions
with fewer side-effects may be more appropriate.
In this paper, we present One-Time Cookies (OTC), an
efficient and robust web session authentication protocol.
OTC generates single-use authentication tokens based on
a modified hash chain construction. These tokens, once
verified by the web application, can not be reused. More-
over, each OTC credential is tied to a specific request for
a resource, meaning that an adversary can not intercept
and repurpose them for illicitly redirecting a session. In
so doing, we make the following contributions:
• Design, verification and implementation of One-
Time Cookies: We develop a protocol based on
a modified hash chain construction that prevents
adversaries from successfully replaying captured
cookies to gain unauthorized control of an HTTP
session. We then use ProVerif [1, 2, 5] to formally
verify the security properties of the OTC protocol.
Finally, we implement our construction as an exten-
sion for the popular blogging platform WordPress,
which currently relies on HTTPS for login and sub-
sequently uses cookies for session management.
• Extensive performance analysis on multiple plat-
forms: We implement plugins for both Firefox and
Firefox for mobile web browsers and perform ex-
tensive performance tests. Our experiments show
an increase in throughput for the server by nearly
51% over enabling site-wide SSL. We also measure
the OTC protocol in scenarios in which distributed
web caches are currently relied upon and parameter-
ize our experiments with round-trip times gathered
from PlanetLab [33] measurements.
• Make our OTC implementation available to the
community: The OTC code for the WordPress
plug-in and the extensions for Firefox and Firefox
mobile is already available here: http://www.
cc.gatech.edu/˜idacosta/otc.html.
Any WordPress based web site can incorporate
OTC in matter of minutes and point their users to
either the desktop or mobile Firefox extensions.
We are very careful not to over-claim the security
guarantees provided by one-time cookies. Specifically,
while our approach efficiently eliminates session hijack-
ing attacks by ensuring session integrity (specifically,
the integrity of navigation requests), it does not provide
for confidentiality or integrity of the content actually re-
quested by users. These are fundamental tradeoffs be-
tween our work and the use of site-wide HTTPS. How-
ever, our mechanism does directly respond to real threats
(e.g., Firesheep [6]) with a performance-conscious solu-
tion that can be deployed without the need for additional
hardware. Our solution therefore lies within a spectrum
of valid techniques and can immediately improve the se-
curity of users of many web applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 offers important background information on
session management on the web and presents our mo-
tivation; Section 3 describes the design, implementation
and formal description of the protocol in which one-time
cookies are used and its security properties; Section 4
presents our experimental testbed, experiments and re-
sults; Section 5 offers additional analysis and discussion
of our proposed solution; Section 6 provides an overview
of important related work; Section 7 offers concluding
remarks.
2 Web Session Authentication
In this section, we present a brief overview of HTTP
cookies as session authentication tokens and session
hijacking attacks. We then discuss current solutions
against these attacks and their lack of widespread deploy-
ment.
2.1 HTTP Cookies
HTTP does not provide support for session management.
Each request and response exchanged between a client
and a server are considered an independent transaction.
While this is sufficient for the most basic static pages,
the need for session management mechanisms increased
with the development of the first web applications. As a
result, HTTP cookies [20,21] were first proposed in 1994
and have since become the dominant mechanism for web
session management.
Cookies consist of name-value pairs containing ses-
sion information. A web application running on the
server generates cookies and sends them to the user in
responses as HTTP headers as follows:
Set-Cookie: SID=645aa87285e8d8adbe97c4f3e22
A web application adds one Set-Cookie header per
cookie to the server’s response. In addition to the cookie
value, the web application can define other parameters
such as domain and path (cookie’s scope), expiration
(cookie’s validity period), HttpOnly flag (defines if the
cookie can be accessed by client-side scripts) and Secure
flag (defines if the cookie can only be sent over a secure
channel; i.e., HTTPS). The browser will add cookies to
each request to the web application as one HTTP header
as follows:
Cookie: SID=645aa87285e8d8adbe97c4f3e22
Cookies used to authenticate user’s requests (authen-
tication cookies) are normally created during the login
process. After successful validation of the user’s primary
authentication credentials (i.e., username and password),
the web application generates new authentication cook-
ies and sends them to the user’s browser. The browser
then appends these cookies to each request that requires
authentication. Using cookies for session authentication
offers several advantages. First, it avoids requiring the
user to enter authentication credentials for every request.
Second, it requires minimal state management in the web
application. This is important for web applications where
state synchronization is difficult (e.g., multiple servers in
different geographical locations). Third, it is a simple
mechanism and is supported by all browsers.
2.2 Problems with Authentication Cookies
Once established, authentication cookies become a tem-
porary replacement of the user’s password. For that rea-
son, they must be properly protected during their life cy-
cle. However, most web applications use authentication
cookies with limited or no protection at all, affecting the
security of the users’ sessions.
Most authentication cookies are static; they do not
change during their life cycle. If an adversary captures
an active authentication cookie, she can replay it to im-
personate the user associated with the cookie(s) and send
arbitrary requests. This problem is known as a session hi-
jacking or sidejacking attack because the adversary takes
control over an active user session. This problem is exac-
erbated by the fact that cookie expiration times can range
from hours to weeks (e.g., “Remember Me” feature) and
the lack of cookie revocation mechanisms in most web
applications.
For an adversary, the easiest way to steal authentica-
tion cookies is by intercepting them while they travel
across the network. Although the user’s password is
securely transmitted during the login process, authenti-
cation cookies are generally transmitted “in the clear”
afterward. Tools such as Hamster [14] and more re-
cently Firesheep [6] make such attacks easily automat-
able. While session hijacking attacks are generally con-
ducted over insecure wireless links, they are also possi-
ble in wired networks through either direct interception
of traffic in routers or potentially from network logs.
Authentication cookies can also be stolen from the
user’s browser. For example, an adversary can use Cross-
Site Scripting (XSS) attacks [38] for this purpose. Such
attacks can be prevented with the HttpOnly parameter,
however, this parameter is not widely used [41]. In ad-
dition, Cross-Site Tracing (XST) [15] and DNS cache
poisoning attacks can also be used to steal cookies from
the browser even if the HttpOnly parameter is enabled.
Finally, authentication cookies are also vulnerable to ses-
sion fixation attacks, where the attacker can set a users’s
authentication cookie to a value the attacker controls.
The result of sidejacking attacks varies. For exam-
ple, an adversary could gain access to user’s private in-
formation and potentially modify it (i.e., defacement at-
tacks). An adversary could also fabricate information
(e.g., spamming and phishing attacks). Finally, an at-
tacker could even change the user’s password and com-
pletely hijack a user’s account.
Many web applications are currently vulnerable to ses-
sion hijacking. Table 1 lists some of the vulnerable web
applications and their position in the Alexa top 100 rank.
The type of web application varies from social network-
ing to e-commerce websites.
2.3 Current Solutions
The most commonly suggested solution for sidejacking
attacks is the site-wide use of HTTP over a secure pro-
tocol such as TLS [11] (i.e., HTTPS). However, as Ta-
ble 1 shows, many web applications do not use HTTPS
for all their requests. Users could also use VPNs (Virtual
Private Network) as protection against session hijacking;












Table 1: Alexa top 100 web applications vulnerable to session
hijacking. The impact of the attack depends on the web appli-
cation functionality. Note that Facebook recently announced
support for site-wide HTTPS, however, it is not enabled by de-
fault (opt-in feature)
up their own VPNs.
A small number of web applications have been taking
steps to move to full HTTPS. Google [25] and more re-
cently Facebook [26], are examples of this trend. Sim-
ilarly, initiatives such as HTTP Strict Transport Secu-
rity (HSTS) [17] and HTTPS Everywhere [12] also pro-
mote site-wide HTTPS support in web applications. Un-
fortunately, adding complete HTTPS support to existing
web applications presents several challenges. First, full
HTTPS support will affect the performance of the web
application, as TLS is an expensive protocol. In ad-
dition, caching mechanisms do not work properly with
HTTPS, further affecting performance. Additionally,
browser performance may also be affected, especially
when mobile platforms are considered. For example,
browser caching mechanisms do not work adequately
and web pages will have to be downloaded in their en-
tirety in order to be displayed (i.e., progressive rendering
does not work). Finally, network services such as net-
work antivirus, IDSs, and content filtering [34] will also
be affected.
In addition to its deployment challenges, the use of full
HTTPS is not a complete solution to the session hijack-
ing problem. HTTPS only provides confidentiality, in-
tegrity and server-side authentication1. Accordingly, au-
thentication cookies are still required for client-side au-
thentication. An adversary can still try to steal the cook-
ies from the user’s web browser. If the cookies are stolen,
HTTPS will not prevent the adversary from taking con-
trol of the user’s session.
Finally, confidentiality of content may not be abso-
lutely critical for all applications. For example, the abil-
ity to see pictures on a social networking website is less
critical than being able to add or delete images to an ac-
1Client-side authentication is possible using client certificates, but
is not commonly supported on Internet environments.
count. Accordingly, a lightweight solution guaranteeing
the session integrity for webpage requests without de-
manding the site-wide deployment of HTTPS could be
beneficial. SessionLock [3] is an approach in this direc-
tion. SessionLock used a shared session secret to sign
each request sent to the web application, thus prevent-
ing session hijacking. By using techniques such as URL
fragment identifiers and URL rewriting, SessionLock of-
fers a simple, easy to deploy solution against session hi-
jacking without requiring full HTTPS support. However,
SessionLock is not robust against active attackers and it
may not work properly in some scenarios. We propose an
alternative mechanism to prevent session hijacking that
overcomes the limitations of SessionLock without affect-
ing performance and deployability (see Section 5.2 for a
more direct comparison). In the next section we present
the details of our approach.
3 OTC Protocol
In this section, we present the One-Time Cookies (OTC)
protocol. First, we describe the threat model assumed in
OTC. Second, we present the protocol’s design and for-
mal definition. Third, we examine the security properties
of OTC and finally, we describe implementation details.
3.1 Threat model
OTC is an HTTP session authentication protocol. It al-
lows a web application to verify the authenticity of the
requests sent by a web browser over untrusted networks.
OTC specifically addresses the threat imposed by session
hijacking attacks.
In our model, the adversary’s goal is to take control of
sessions already established by users of a web applica-
tion. OTC assumes two types of adversaries: passive and
active. A passive adversary has access to all the informa-
tion exchanged between the browser and the web appli-
cation. She can access this information directly from the
network (online) or from network logs (offline). Based
on this information, the passive adversary will try to fab-
ricate or reuse authentication tokens to hijack a user’s
session. An active adversary has the same access to in-
formation as the passive one, but in addition, an active
adversary can actively modify the requests and responses
exchanged between the browser and the web application.
For example, the active adversary can tamper messages,
fabricate new messages and stop messages from reach-
ing their destination. In addition, an active adversary can
execute application level attacks against the browser and
the web application, including cross-site scripting (XSS),
cross-site tracing (XST) and session fixation attacks. We











Hash forward n times
r
Figure 1: Hash chains are generated by hashing a secret value
r forward n times. A principal Bob stores the current value of
the hash chain (Hc). A participant Alice can prove knowledge
of the initial secret by presenting Bob with the previous value
(Hc−1). If Bob hashes Alice’s input and generates Hc, Alice
must know the initial secret due to the one-way property of hash
algorithms. Bob then makes the current value Hc−1 and waits
for Alice to provide Hc−2.
CSRF and phishing) or attacks that exploit vulnerabili-
ties in the supporting software (e.g., web browser, web
framework, HTTP server and operating system) such as
buffer overflows and malware. Also, we do not consider
denial of service attacks.
Finally, OTC initially relies on HTTPS to initially es-
tablish its credentials. This establishment step is also cur-
rently used by many websites that rely on authentication
cookies. Therefore, OTC assumes that HTTPS is estab-
lished correctly and in a secure way. Our model does not
consider attacks against HTTPS.
3.2 Design
OTC is designed to eliminate the vulnerabilities associ-
ated with the use of cookies as session authentication
tokens. OTC offers an intermediate solution between
the vulnerable use of authentication cookies and the se-
cure but expensive use of site-wide HTTPS. OTC relies
on single-use authentication tokens based on modified
hash chains. Once an OTC authentication token is vali-
dated by the web application, it can not be reused for au-
thentication, hence, preventing session hijacking attacks.
Moreover, each authentication token is tied directly to
the requested resource for additional security.
A hash chain [22] is a cryptographic construction used
in a number of security applications and protocols. It is
created by applying a cryptographic hash function H()
(e.g., SHA-1) multiple times to a random value r to gen-
erate a sequence of values that can be used as one-time
authentication tokens (Figure 1). Hash chain security re-
lies on the pre-image resistant (i.e., one-way) property of
cryptographic hash functions.
OTC’s design follows several goals. Session integrity:
OTC should be more robust than authentication cook-
ies and should prevent session hijacking attacks. Perfor-
mance: OTC should have a minimal impact on the per-
formance of the web application and the web browser.
Web App
GET login.php HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [X-OTC: 0; n; https://www.myapp.org/login.php]
POST login.php HTTP/1.1 [ {uid, pwd} {X-OTC-CRED: n; Hn(r); s; nonce'} ]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [X-OTC: 1; uid; n-1; nonce'; HMAC(s, uid || n-1 || nonce')]
GET private.php HTTP/1.1 [X-OTC-VAL: uid; Hi(r); i; nonce''; HMAC(s, uid || url || Hi(r) || i || nonce'' )]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [X-OTC: 2; i-1; nonce''; HMAC(s, i-1 || nonce'')]
GET page.php HTTP/1.1 [X-OTC-VAL: uid; H1(r); 1; nonce'''; HMAC(s, uid || url || H1(s) || 1 || nonce''' )]
HTTP/1.1 200 OK [X-OTC: 2; 0; nonce'''; HMAC(s, 0 || nonce''')]
.











Figure 2: Flow diagram of a web session authenticated with OTC. Messages 1 to 4 show the OTC setup phase and messages 5 to 8
show the OTC authentication phase. Each HTTP request and response include an OTC header with protocol information. HMACs
are used to protect the integrity of the values in the OTC headers and to tie each OTC value to a particular requested resource.
1. C → S : url
2. S → C : [X-OTC:0, n, login-url]
3. C → S : uid, pwd,
[X-OTC-CRED:n,Hn(r), s, nonce]
4. S → C : [X-OTC:1, uid, n− 1, nonce,
HMAC(s, uid||n− 1||nonce)]
5. C → S : [X-OTC-VAL:uid,Hi(r), i,
nonce,HMAC(s, uid||url||Hi(r)||)]
6. S → C : [X-OTC:2, i− 1, nonce,
HMAC(s, i− 1||nonce)]
C, S : browser, Web application
uid, pwd : username and password
r, n, i : Hash chain secret seed, length and current
sequence number
s : shared session secret
url : URL of the resource requested by the client
login-url : URL of the application’s login service
H
i
(x) : i-th hash value of x, H(H(...H(x)...))
HMAC(k, x) : HMAC with key k on x
X-OTC* : HTTP headers used for exchanging
OTC protocol information
Figure 3: One-Time Cookie protocol: Formal definition of the OTC protocol. OTC assumes that the setup phase (steps 1 to 4) is
executed over an encrypted connection (HTTPS)
Its efficiency should be comparable to the one of authen-
tication cookies. Deployability: OTC should be easy to
implement in both, the web browser and the web appli-
cation. It should have a low implementation cost. Us-
ability: OTC should be easy to use and provide a user
experience similar to the use of cookies.
The OTC protocol consists of two phases: setup and
authentication. In the setup phase, the web browser gen-
erates the OTC credentials and sends them to the web
application. In our design, the browser generates the cre-
dentials to reduce the load in the web application, pro-
viding better scalability. Both the browser and the web
application store OTC state. Once the server validates the
OTC credentials, the authentication phase starts. During
this phase, the browser uses the OTC credentials to gen-
erate one-time cookies that are appended to each request
sent to the web application. These temporary credentials
are then validated by the web application to verify the
authenticity of the request. This phase continues until
the hash chain in the OTC credentials is completely ex-
hausted or the user ends her session.
3.3 Formal Description
Figure 2 shows a graphical description of the OTC pro-
tocol and Figure 3 presents its formal definition. In these
figures, messages 1 to 4 represent the OTC setup phase,
and messages 5 to 8 represent the OTC authentication
phase. The scenario depicted in these figures assumes
that the web browser and the web application have not
established OTC credentials before. Therefore, if the
user requests a private resource from the web applica-
tion (e.g., personal profile page), the web application will
redirect the user’s browser to the login page for explicit
authentication. During the login process, the OTC proto-
col will setup its credentials in both parties (setup phase).
Once the user logs in successfully, OTC will be used (in-
stead of authentication cookies) for session authentica-
tion (authentication phase).
In Step 1, the browser establishes an HTTPS session
with the web application and requests the login page.
HTTPS is required to provide server-side authentication
and to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
user’s primary authentication credentials (i.e., username
and password). OTC also uses this secure connection to
transmit its credentials.
In Step 2, the web application sends the login page
over HTTPS. The login page includes an additional
HTTP header: X-OTC. This header tells the browser that
the web application supports the OTC protocol. This
header contains three (3) values. The first value (0), is a
status flag that indicates that the web application is ready
to start the OTC protocol and that the browser has to gen-
erate new OTC credentials. The second value (n) cor-
responds to the hash chain length recommended by the
web application. The third value (login-url) contains
the URL where the browser has to send the new OTC
credentials. This should be the same URL that was used
by the browser to send the user’s login information.
In Step 3, the browser generates new OTC creden-
tials and sends them over HTTPS to the web application
together with the user’s login information (generally an
HTTP POST request). The OTC credentials are sent in a
new HTTP header: X-OTC-CRED. This header contains
the following values: the hash chain length (n), the hash
chain (Hn(r)), a session secret (s) and a nonce. The
browser creates a new record in memory for the web ap-
plication’s domain and stores the following values: the
hash chain secret seed (r), the shared session secret (s),
the hash chain sequence index (i), the login-url and the
domain. Initially, i = n− 1.
In Step 4, the web application validates the user’s pri-
mary authentication credentials (e.g., username and pass-
word). If this validation is successful, the web applica-
tion proceeds to store in memory the new OTC creden-
tials (s,Hn(r), i = n − 1) together with other user’s
session information. Then, the web application sends a
200 OK response to the browser including a new X-OTC
header. This header indicates that the new OTC cre-
dentials are ready for use. This header contains a sta-
tus code set to 1 (OTC credentials activated), the user
id (this value is optional and application-dependent), the
position of the next hash chain value expected (n − 1),
a nonce and a HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentica-
tion Code) used to protect the integrity of the values in
the header. The HMAC also provides server-side authen-
tication by means of the session secret s. After receiving
and verifying the web application response, the browser
activates the OTC credentials (end of setup phase).
In Step 5, the browser requests a private resource from
the web application. The request includes a new HTTP
header: X-OTC-VAL. This header contains the user id,
the next hash chain value (Hi(r) where i = n − 1 in
the first iteration), the sequence index i, a nonce, and a
HMAC. In this step, the HMAC also includes the URL
of the requested resource (tying the hash chain value to
its specific request). After receiving the request, the web
application first verifies that the sequence index included
in the OTC header matches the one in memory. Upon
success, the web application proceeds to verify the hash
chain value. For this verification, the web application
performs one hash operation over the value included in
the request and compares it to the value stored in mem-
ory. If the values match, the web application continues
with the verification of the HMAC using the shared se-
cret s stored in memory. If all the previous verifications
are successful, the request is considered valid. Then, the
web application updates the hash chain value in mem-
ory and decrements the sequence index by one. If any
of the previous verifications fails, the request is canceled
and the web application redirects the browser to the login
page (Step 2).
In Step 6, after a successful OTC authentication, the
web application sends a 200 OK response code and the
requested resource to the browser. The response also in-
cludes an X-OTC header with a status value set to 2 (suc-
cessful OTC authentication). The header also includes
the index of the next hash chain value (i−1) expected by
the web application, a nonce and a HMAC. After verify-
ing the header information, the browser updates its OTC
state (e.g., decrements its hash chain sequence index).
As shown in Figure 2 (messages 7 and 8), the browser
continues using OTC for session authentication until the
hash chain is exhausted (i = 0). Then, the web appli-
cation redirects the user’s browser to the login page to
start a new session (Step 2). Alternately, OTC can be
extended to support automatic renewal of its credentials
(see Section 5.4).
3.4 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss the security properties of the
OTC protocol and examine how they address the current
security threats against web session management.
The main goal of the OTC protocol is to prevent
session hijacking attacks. To achieve this, OTC uses
hash chains to generate single-use authentication cook-
ies (similar to the idea of one-time password protocols).
Therefore, every request sent from a browser will include
a unique authentication token that, once verified by the
web application, can not be reused (the tokens become
invalid immediately as opposed to the use of an expira-
tion time like cookies). As a result, a passive adversary
using tools such as Hamster or Firesheep will not be able
to hijack users’ sessions. Similarly, access to network
logs will be of no help to adversaries.
Active adversaries could try more advanced attacks.
For example, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack where
the adversary captures the OTC value and prevents it
from reaching the web application. To limit the impact of
such attacks, OTC implements additional security mea-
sures. First, OTC ties each hash chain value to the re-
quest’s URL by using an HMAC. The adversary can not
forge the HMAC because she does not know the session
secret (s). Consequently, the adversary can not use the
captured OTC value for arbitrary requests, only for the
original user’s request 2. Second, the browser will not re-
lease new OTC values until receiving confirmation from
the web application that the current active value has been
used. As before, the adversary can not forge the web
application OTC confirmation header because she does
not know s. Therefore, the adversary can not imperson-
ate the web application to the browser to obtain unused
OTC values.
From the previous paragraph, we can conclude that
in order to hijack a session an adversary needs both
an active hash chain value (or the hash chain secret
seed r) and the shared session secret s. To formally
prove that OTC does not leak either r and s during the
authentication phase (Steps 5 and 6 in Figure 2), we
used ProVerif [1, 2, 5], an automatic cryptographic pro-
tocol verifier. We translated a single OTC authentication
transaction into Horn clauses and gave it as an input to
ProVerif. The tool’s output successfully confirmed that
both r and s remain secret during the transaction. The
Horn clause translation of the OTC transaction and the
output of ProVerif are included in the Appendix of this
paper.
Though the protocol guarantees the secrecy of r and s,
there are other methods to obtain these values. An active
adversary could try to attack the user’s browser, the only
place where these values are stored. Common scripting
attacks such as XSS can not be used to steal OTC cre-
dentials because the OTC’s browser extension does not
expose these values to script languages or other browser
components (e.g., stored in private objects). OTC cre-
dentials are used exclusively for authentication purposes,
hence, they do not need to be shared. Moreover, ses-
2An adversary could still modify the payload information in the
original user’s request. For example, changing the text of a blog post
request. To prevent this, OTC can be extended to compute a hash of the
HTTP payload and include it in the HMAC to protect its integrity.
sion fixation attacks will not work against OTC for sim-
ilar reasons. Other active attacks such as XST and DNS
cache poisoning can be used to leak active OTC values;
however, as we mentioned before, these values can not
be used for arbitrary requests. Finally, OTC offers no
protection against attacks where the adversary acquires
control of the user’s computer or misleads the user into
sending requests to the web application (e.g., phishing
and CSRF attacks).
The robustness of OTC relies on the security prop-
erties of hash chain and HMAC operations, both well-
known and frequently used cryptographic constructions.
There are no reported critical vulnerabilities affecting
these two mechanisms. Reported vulnerabilities affect-
ing cryptographic hash algorithms [40] do not impact
hash chains because hash chains rely only in the pre-
image property of hash algorithms. Moreover, if the
particular hash algorithm employed by OTC becomes
vulnerable, OTC can be easily modified to support a
different algorithm. For further protection, nonce val-
ues are added to each HMAC operation. The use of a
nonce guarantees the freshness of the web application re-
sponses and makes OTC resistant to analysis and proto-
col attacks. As a result, we can conclude that OTC values
are robust against guessing and brute force attacks and
cryptanalysis.
The OTC protocol differs from traditional hash
chain authentication protocols such as the Lamport’s
scheme [22] and S/Key [16]. Lamport’s scheme and
S/Key use a challenge-response approach. However, that
approach is not efficient for web session authentication
because it adds an extra round trip to each request. To
avoid this problem, OTC maintains a synchronized state
between the browser and the web application. Hence,
the browser does not need a challenge from the web ap-
plication to know what OTC value to send next. In addi-
tion, by using extra security checks (i.e., HMACs), OTC
is more robust against attacks affecting other hash chain
authentication protocols [27] (e.g., server impersonation,
small “n” attacks).
Finally, OTC only provides robust client-side session
authentication (via hash chains) and server-side authenti-
cation (via shared session secret). OTC does not provide
integrity protection or confidentiality to the HTTP pay-
load.
3.5 OTC implementation
As described in Section 3.2, OTC requires a client and
a server component. On the server side, we imple-
mented OTC as a plug-in for WordPress (a popular open-
source web content management system). This plug-in
was developed in PHP language and required approx-
imately 300 lines of code. Most of this code, how-
ever, was needed for integration with WordPress (OTC
setup and verification required less than 100 lines of
code). On the client side, we implemented OTC as
an extension for Firefox (desktop and mobile versions).
The Firefox extension was developed using XUL and
JavaScript languages and also required approximately
300 lines of code. In addition, the Firefox extension
uses the jsSHA 3 library for hash operations. Both
plug-ins and their supporting documentation are cur-
rently available at http://www.cc.gatech.edu/
˜idacosta/otc.html.
We implemented OTC using a software plug-in ap-
proach for easier deployment. Installing and activating
OTC support in WordPress and Firefox take only min-
utes. The OTC code logic on the server side is sim-
ple and it should be easy to adapt it to other web ap-
plications. OTC could also be implemented at the HTTP
server level (e.g., Apache web server) to increase deploy-
ability. However, most web applications prefer to imple-
ment their own authentication mechanisms as opposed to
the mechanisms offered by the web server. The reason is
that the mechanisms offered by the server (e.g., Digest
authentication) do not integrate well with the look and
feel of the web application.
As it was mentioned earlier, the browser and the web
application exchange OTC values and responses using
HTTP headers. In our implementation, the X-OTC-Val





The corresponding X-OTC header containing the web




Finally, our OTC implementation uses SHA-1 as the
default cryptographic hash algorithm. However, support
for other hash algorithms can be added with few modifi-
cations to our code base.
4 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we present the experimental evaluation of
our implementation. Our goal is to characterize and com-
pare the performance overheads added by OTC and cur-
rent session authentication alternatives (e.g., cookies and
cookies with HTTPS). First, we describe the experimen-
tal testbed used in our experiments. We then present each
3
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experiment and its results.
4.1 Experimental Testbed
Our experimental testbed consists of five servers: one
web server, one proxy server and three servers for gen-
erating the test load. All the servers run Ubuntu 8.04
(Linux Kernel 2.6.24) and have 2 Quad-Core 2.00 GHz
processors, 16 GB of memory and Gigabit Ethernet
cards. Also, all the servers are connected to a dedicated
Gigabit Ethernet switch. To simulate WAN latency val-
ues in some of our experiments, we use the Linux traffic
control tool with the network emulation module (netem)
and set these latencies based on RTT (Round-Trip Time)
values collected experimentally from the PlanetLab net-
work testbed.
The web server runs WordPress 3.0 (web application).
WordPress is configured with the BuddyPress 1.2 plug-
in, which adds social network features to WordPress. To
support WordPress, the server uses Apache 2.2 (HTTP
server), MySQL 5.0 (database) and PHP 5.3 (web devel-
opment language). All software in the web server use de-
fault configurations without performance optimizations.
The only exception is the Apache HTTP server, which
was modified to support a higher number of simultane-
ous requests, requests per connection and file descriptors.
The proxy server uses Squid 3.1, an open source web
proxy and caching server. Squid is configured in a re-
verse proxy mode (web accelerator) to cache requests
directed to the web server. The single processing core
model of squid creates a performance bottleneck. To
avoid this, we run three squid instances on the same
server. Each instance is configured with its default pa-
rameters.
The test load is generated using httperf 0.9 [28], a tool
for measuring the performance of web servers. A total of
three httperf instances (one per server) are used to gener-
ate the test load in our experiments. We wrote our own
script to automate execution and data collection of the
benchmarking experiments.
To evaluate our OTC implementation in the client side,
we use two platforms: a laptop (MacBook Pro with a
dual core 2.53 GHz processor, 4GB of memory and Mac
OS X 10.6) and a smartphone (Google Nexus One with
1 GHz processor, 512 MB of memory and Android 2.2).
In the laptop we use Mozilla Firefox 3.6 and in the smart-
phone Mozilla Firefox for mobile 4.03b.
4.2 Experiments and Results
We evaluate three scenarios: cookies (our baseline), OTC
and cookies with HTTPS. First, we present the results of
our micro-benchmarks experiments in the web applica-
tion, the laptop and the smartphone, focusing on mea-
Protocol Cookies (95% c.i) OTC (95% c. i.)
Setup time (ms) 0.194 (±0.004) 1.592 (±0.064)
Verif. time (ms) 1.110 (±0.039) 2.646 (±0.062)
Table 2: Web application (WordPress) credentials setup and
verification time for cookies and OTC. Both mechanisms in-
troduce approximately similar delay (the difference is due to
WordPress memory operations used by OTC). Note: c.i. = con-
fidence intervals.
suring the delay added by each configuration. Second,
we present our macro-benchmark experiments where we
focus on measuring the impact of each configuration in
the performance (e.g., throughput and CPU utilization)
of the web server under an increasing test load. Third, we
show the results of evaluating the performance of the web
server in a reverse caching scenario. Finally, each exper-
iment was repeated multiple times to ensure the sound-
ness of the results. Mean values and 95% confidence
intervals are reported for all experiments.
4.2.1 Micro-Benchmarks
In the web application (WordPress), we first measured
the time to setup the session authentication credentials.
This time corresponds to the time required by the web ap-
plication to have the credentials (cookies or OTC) ready
for session authentication (typically after a successful
user login). It includes the time to generate the cookies
before sending them to the browser. For OTC, it includes
the time that the OTC WordPress plug-in takes to parse
and store the credentials sent by the browser. Second,
we measured the verification time: the time that Word-
Press takes to verify cookies and OTC values for session
authentication. In both cases, we used code instrumenta-
tion to measure these times.
Table 2 shows the average results and confidence in-
tervals (20 samples per value) for setup and verification
time. For the setup time, we can see that cookies require
less time than OTC credentials. However, the difference
is small (∼ 1.4 ms) and is unlikely to impact the ap-
plication’s performance. Moreover, we determined that
the difference is mainly due to WordPress memory oper-
ations used by the OTC plug-in. A similar situation oc-
curs with the verification time. OTC verification took ap-
proximately 1.54 ms more than for cookies. Again, this
difference is small and is mainly due to WordPress op-
erations. These results are expected because the cookie
generation and verification processes in WordPress are
based on hash and HMAC operations, as in OTC. There-
fore, we can conclude that the overhead added to the web
application by both mechanisms is small and approxi-
mately the same.
The main difference between OTC and cookies resides
Chain Length 100 1K 10K 100K
Laptop t (ms) 7.22 70.22 701.04 6957.82
(95% c.i.) ±0.09 ±2.69 ±12.23 ±87.01
S. phone t (ms) 49.30 462.43 4423.27 –
(95% c.i.) ±1.70 ±11.82 ±80.42 –
Table 3: Time required to generate hash chains of different
length in a laptop and in a smartphone. Hash chains with a
length up to 10,000 (laptop) and 1,000 (smartphone) can be
used without affecting the user experience.
in the client side. With cookies, the browser only stores
the cookies and attaches them to every request. With
OTC, the browser does more work: credential genera-
tion and storage, HMAC operations, and generation of
hash chain values. However, these operations are fast
(e.g., simple hash operations), except for the generation
of the hash chain and hash chain values. Therefore, we
measured the time required to generate hash chains of
different lengths (100, 1,000, 10,000 and 100,000) using
the OTC extension for Firefox (laptop) and Firefox for
mobile (smartphone). The results are shown in Table 3.
In the laptop, the OTC extension could use hash chains
with a length up to 10,000 without affecting performance
significantly. As expected, the hash chain computation
takes additional time on the smartphone. In the smart-
phone, a hash chains with a length up to 1,000 can be
used without noticeable delay. We note that our OTC
extensions have not been optimized. For example, we
could use C++ code instead of JavaScript to reduce the
time to generate hash chains. Moreover, we could cache
intermediate hash chain values to reduce the number of
computations required (see Section 5.1).
The appropriate hash chain length depends on the web
application and the user. To estimate the hash chain
length required by a complex web application, we mea-
sured the number of requests with authentication cook-
ies that are generated during Facebook sessions. For this
test, we developed a simple Firefox extension and dis-
tributed it among members of our lab. The data col-
lected (32 sessions) showed that on average, a Face-
book session can generate 11.13 authenticated requests
per minute (95% c.i. ±2.34) with a maximum of 28.38
requests per minute. Based on these results, we can esti-
mate that a Facebook user may require hundreds of OTC
values per session. Therefore, a hash chain with a length
of 1,000 could be sufficient to maintain a Facebook ses-
sion for a day.
We also ran micro-benchmark experiments (e.g.,
server response time, web page rendering time, CPU uti-
lization) to measure the overhead added by HTTPS to the
web application and the browsers (desktop and mobile).
However, under a low test load, the difference between



































Figure 4: Request throughput supported by the web server for
cookies, OTC and cookies with HTTPS configurations. While
OTC and cookies have approximately the same performance,




























Figure 5: Web server CPU utilization for cookies, OTC and
cookies with HTTPS configurations. As expected, the use of
HTTPS requires more CPU time for the same load than cookies
or OTC
cally significant. The impact of HTTPS was more notice-
able under higher test loads, as the next section shows.
Finally, storage overheads are discussed in Section 5.1.
4.2.2 Macro-benchmarks
For a more direct comparison between OTC and HTTPS,
we focused on measuring performance during HTTPS
steady state, avoiding the costs of HTTPS connection
setup (known to be expensive [9]). Therefore, in these
experiments we used a small and constant number of
connections while increasing the number of requests
made over these connections (as opposed to increasing
the number of connections). In other words, we sim-
ulated the load generated by users that already logged
in to the web application. In addition, we used basic



































Figure 6: Request throughput supported by the web server in
the presence of a reverse proxy for 3 configurations: cookies,
OTC and cookies with HTTPS. While OTC and cookies benefit
from the use of the reverse proxy, the performance of HTTPS
quickly degrades.
WordPress pages. The reason is that our default Word-
Press installation was not optimized for performance (it
supported less than 100 requests/sec). Finally, each ex-
periment was repeated at least 10 times for each config-
uration.
The results for request throughput are shown in Fig-
ure 4. The impact of using HTTPS is considerable at
high loads. When using cookies and OTC session au-
thentication, the web application supported 10,327.72
(95% confidence interval ±39.56) and 10,073.21 (95%
c.i. ±23.50) requests/sec respectively. However, when
using cookies with HTTPS, the web application could
only support approximately 6681.78 (95% c.i. ±53.16)
requests/sec. These results represent a 35.30 % reduc-
tion in request throughput when compared to the baseline
configuration (cookies). Also, the request rate supported
by OTC was only 2.46% smaller than cookies. Figure 5
shows the web server CPU utilization during the experi-
ments for each configuration. For each configuration, the
maximum CPU utilization measured was 77.74% (95%
c.i. ±1.04) for cookies, 78.09% (95% c.i. ±1.04) for
OTC and 84.84% (95% c.i. ±0.72) for cookies with
HTTPS. We can ee that the use of HTTPS requires more
CPU time for the same throughput than HTTP. In addi-
tion, OTC and cookies require approximately the same
CPU utilization during the experiments. Based on these
results, we conclude that both OTC and cookies, have
approximately the same performance in terms of request
rate and CPU utilization. Moreover, the use of HTTPS
causes a significant impact on the performance of the
web server when high request loads are used.
4.2.3 Web Caching Scenario
The performance of a web application is not solely af-
fected by the overheads introduced by HTTPS. As men-
tioned in Section 2.3, distributed caching and replication
mechanisms do not work properly when HTTPS is used,
further affecting the application’s performance. We ran
additional experiments to characterize how HTTPS af-
fects the performance benefits of a reverse proxy caching
web content. For these experiments, we measured the
RTT between a server in California and a server in Texas
using PlanetLab. We then simulated the measured la-
tency (47.32 ms) in the network link between our Word-
Press server (web application) and our Squid server (re-
verse proxy). We also added a 5.0 ms latency between
our load generator servers (clients) and the Squid server.
The generated load consisted of requesting a basic PHP
page with OTC and cookie support and five images.
The results for request throughput are presented in
Figure 6. The reverse proxy reduces the load on the web
server by caching the images for HTTP requests (cook-
ies and OTC). In contrast, the proxy can not process
requests made over HTTPS because they are encrypted
and have to be forwarded to the web server. The ex-
periments show that the server can support a maximum
of 10,577.67 (95% c.i. ±80.76) requests/sec for cook-
ies with HTTPS. However, the use of the reserve proxy
allows the web server to support more than 15,000 re-
quests/sec for cookies and OTC configurations. At this
point, the server CPU utilization was only approximately
17%, demonstrating that our testbed can support much
higher throughput when cookies and OTC configurations
are used. These results show the negative effect that en-
abling site-wide HTTPS could have on the performance
of a web application by affecting other infrastructure




Compared to cookies, OTC requires additional re-
sources. In the web application, OTC requires extra
memory space to store the authentication credentials of
each user. However, the space required by these cre-
dentials is small: two text strings (e.g., 160 bits) and a
counter (e.g., 32 bits). This is a small requirement com-
pared to the amount of state information that most web
applications already store for their users. As our experi-
ments showed (see Section 4.2.1), cookies and OTC add
approximately the same computational overhead to the
web application.
In the browser, OTC requires memory space and com-
putation while cookies only require memory space. OTC
memory requirements per domain are small (e.g., six text
strings, a counter and a status flag) and similar to cook-
ies’ requirements (RFC 2695 specifies that cookies can
have a size up to 4096 bytes). Regarding computation,
the most expensive OTC operations in the browser are
the generation of credentials and the generation of one-
time cookies. The cost of these operations is directly pro-
portional to the hash chain length. However, as our ex-
periments showed (see Section 4.2.1), the performance
overheads added by these operations is acceptable for
practical hash chain lengths.
OTC can also be modified to reduce its performance
overhead in the browser. For example, hash chains can
be generated in advance (i.e., background process) and
stored until needed. Also, the computation of hash chain
values can be reduced if those values are cached during
the generation of the hash chains (trading-off computa-
tion for memory space). OTC could cache hash chain
values at intervals (e.g., every 100 positions) or cache
all the values. By caching all the hash chain values, the
overhead added by OTC in each requests will be signifi-
cantly smaller and close to the overhead added by cook-
ies. Note that caching hash chain values does not reduce
OTC’s security because the hash chain secret seed value
(r) is already stored in the browser.
5.2 SessionLock
SessionLock [3] is another proposed technique to prevent
session hijacking attacks without requiring full HTTPS
support. By using a shared session secret, SessionLock
signs each request sent to the web application. As OTC,
the session secret is established during the user’s login
process over HTTPS. The session secret is then stored in
the web browser by using URL fragment identifiers and
URL rewriting techniques, thus avoiding the need for a
browser extension.
While OTC and SessionLock have almost similar
complexity in the server, SessionLock is simpler in the
browser and easier to deploy (no browser extension re-
quired). However, SessionLock has several limitations.
First, SessionLock does not protect against active attacks
(e.g., code injection) that could compromise the session
secret. OTC, in contrast, is more robust against active
attacks (see Section 3.4). Second, SessionLock may not
work properly with certain web applications. For exam-
ple, the URL rewriting techniques will not work when
binary objects (i.e., Flash) are used to generate dynamic
links. Also URL rewriting could be prone to errors with
complex web pages. OTC does not use URL rewrit-
ing. Third, SessionLock’s shared secret could be acci-
dentally leaked by the user or lost. In OTC, the session
secrets (e.g., r and s) are only accessible to OTC func-
tions (there is no public API). The user or other browser
components can not access these values. Therefore, the
user can not leak these values accidentally. Finally, Ses-
sionLock has not been as thoroughly evaluated in terms
of performance and compatibility with current web ap-
plications. In contrast, we have implemented OTC as
a plug-in for the popular WordPress platform and as an
extension for both, Firefox and Firefox for mobile. We
have executed extensive performance evaluation of our
OTC implementation, and our code is already available
for public evaluation. Moreover, we are exploring the
idea of modifying OTC to provide an OTC version that
does not require a browser extension (like SessionLock).
5.3 State Synchronization In Large Web
Applications
OTC requires state synchronization (i.e., sequence num-
ber and current hash chain value) between the web ap-
plication and the web browser to work properly. There-
fore, in large web applications, where the web applica-
tion is hosted by multiple servers (e.g., server cluster),
OTC state has to be synchronized among all the servers
to guarantee that any server can verify the OTC values.
Generally, this requirement is not difficult for servers in
the same physical area. However, it is a problem for
web applications with servers distributed over large ge-
ographical areas (e.g., Facebook) because of the effects
of network latency. In these scenarios, it is difficult to
guarantee that all the servers have the same OTC state at
any given time. As a result, OTC verifications could fail,
affecting the user experience.
OTC can be easily modified to solve this synchro-
nization problem. The key idea is that the web browser
will always have the latest hash chain index value (e.g.,
i = 100) and the servers will always have a similar or
higher value (i.e., if the server is not synchronized, then
i > 100). Using this idea, the OTC verification in the
web application can be modified to calculate the differ-
ence between both sequence indexes. Then, the web ap-
plication will perform additional hash operations during
the verification process, based on the difference between
the indexes. As a result, any server with the initial OTC
state can verify subsequent web browser requests, even
if its state is not synchronized with the web browser and
the rest of the servers. A threshold of hashing operations
can be established during setup to prevent small “n” at-
tacks [19]. Finally, if the hash chain is exhausted, the
web application will redirect the web browser to the lo-
gin page. Once the user logs in, the new OTC credentials
will be distributed to all the servers (this operation can
take longer time to ensure that all the servers receive the
new OTC credentials).
5.4 Automatic Renewal
The adequate hash chain length depends on the web ap-
plication. For example, applications with high session
activity will require longer hash chains. The web ap-
plication can also recommend customized hash chain
lengths based on the user’s activity history and prefer-
ences. Once a hash chain is exhausted, the web applica-
tion will require the user to log in again over an HTTPS
connection. However, if the web application is consum-
ing hash chains too fast and asking users to log in too
often, user experience will be affected.
In scenarios where the web application can not esti-
mate the appropriate hash chain length for its users, OTC
can be modified to support automatic credential renewal
without user interaction. Basically, the OTC component
in the web browser will automatically generate new cre-
dentials once the hash chain has been exhausted. Then it
will send it to the web application using a HTTPS con-
nection without user intervention and using the shared
session secret (s) to validate the renewal operation. In
addition, to improve performance, the transmission of
new OTC credentials could be executed without HTTPS.
The web browser could use the shared session secret to
encrypt the new credentials before sending them to the
server over HTTP. We plan to explore this idea and in-
clude it in future versions of OTC.
6 Related Work
The use of cookies for client authentication and ses-
sion management has raised security concerns since their
adoption. In 2000, Park et al. [29] described the secu-
rity threats to cookies: network, end-system and system-
harvesting threats and proposed the use of secure cook-
ies based on cryptographic techniques. A year later, Fu
et al. [13] showed the problems and limitations of web
client authentication mechanisms, including the risks of
using Web cookies and session hijacking attacks. The
authors presented several recommendations for building
more robust Web client authentication schemes. How-
ever, the web industry has done very little since then to
solve the problems associated with the use of Web cook-
ies for session management. In order to raise aware-
ness, the white-hat hacker community has released sev-
eral tools that automate session hijacking attacks (“side-
jacking”) [6, 7, 14, 32]. Nevertheless, these problems are
still present today. In a recent study of 40 Web appli-
cations, Visaggio and Blasio [39] found that few use
HTTPS (15%) and that most Web applications do not
protect cookies properly. As a result, most of these Web
applications are vulnerable to session hijacking attacks.
A typically recommended solution against session hi-
jacking attacks is to encrypt the HTTP payload ex-
changed between the Web browser and the Web server.
While IPSec VPNs or SSH tunnels can be used for this
purpose, SSL/TLS (HTTPS) is the most common al-
ternative to encrypt HTTP traffic. However, even with
HTTPS enabled, there are ways for adversaries to steal
session cookies [31]. For example, several studies have
shown that users tend to ignore HTTPS errors [35, 36].
Adversaries can exploit this situation to perform man-in-
the-middle attacks (MITM) or entice users to establish
non-HTTPS requests that will expose the session cook-
ies. As a result, Jackson and Barth [18] proposed Force-
HTTPS, a browser add-on that ensures that all session
cookies are securely configured and forces all HTTPS
errors to be treated as attacks, not merely configuration
mistakes. Based on this work, a new web security pol-
icy mechanism, named HTTP Strict Transport Security
(HSTS), is being proposed to the IETF [17]. A similar
approach is used by the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) tool named HTTPS Everywhere [12] that rewrites
all the requests to a web site to use HTTPS. Neverthe-
less, MITM attacks are still possible, as demonstrated
by Chen et al. [8] in their analysis of the Pretty-Bad-
Proxy adversary threat. In addition, a well-known con-
cern with the use of HTTPS for all the communication
with a web server is the high impact on performance [9]
and the compatibility problems with existing function-
ality in web applications (i.e., web caching). An alter-
native was recently presented by Bittau et al. [4], where
the authors proposed tcpcrypt, a TCP extension designed
to provide efficient, backward compatible end-to-end en-
cryption of TCP traffic by default. While the authors
demonstrated that tcpcrypt is a more robust and efficient
alternative to SSL/TLS, this approach could take a long
time to be tested, adopted and deployed at large scale in
the Internet.
Another approach against session hijacking attacks
is the design and implementation of more robust web
authentication and session management protocols. Fu
et al. [13] proposed a simple web client authentication
scheme based on unforgeable cookies with explicit expi-
ration time. While this scheme is secure against adaptive
chosen message attacks, it is still vulnerable to replay at-
tacks (i.e., replaying non-expired cookies) and does not
provide an efficient revocation mechanism. As a result,
Liu et al. [23] proposed a secure cookie protocol that
offers better security guaranties than the protocol pro-
posed by Fu. However, the authors only presented a
brief security analysis of this protocol and it is not clear
it provides all the security guarantees claimed (authen-
tication, confidentiality, integrity and antireplay). In ad-
dition, this protocol is still vulnerable to server compro-
mised. SessionLock by Adida [3] is the closest work to
ours. Relying on URL fragment identifiers, time-stamps
and JavaScript, SessionLock uses a session secret to sign
each request to the web server. However, this mechanism
requires rewriting all links in a web page, which could be
computationally expensive and error-prone in the case of
complex web applications (i.e., a web application that
uses dynamic links generated by binary objects such as
Flash). Adida also notes that SessionLock offers no pro-
tection against active attackers that could steal the ses-
sion secret by injecting malicious code. Our proposed
mechanism, one-time cookies, is similarly light-weight
and directly addresses these shortcomings. It uses a mod-
ified hash chain construction [22] to provide better secu-
rity guarantees against replay attacks. Hash chains have
been used in lightweight security protocols in other do-
mains such as sensor networks [24, 30], RFID tags [37]
and more recently VoIP [10]. Our work is the first to take
advantage of the security properties of hash chains in the
realm of web session authentication.
7 Conclusion
Session hijacking attacks have gained a considerable
amount of media attention since the release of Firesheep,
creating a new push for solving this problem. As a result,
several web applications have already implemented site-
wide HTTPS, the recommended solution against ses-
sion hijacking. While completely replacing HTTP with
HTTPS will improve the overall security of the Web, it
can be a challenging and complex project for some web
applications. In particular, site-wide HTTPS can be diffi-
cult to justify for web applications with limited resources
and low confidentiality requirements. As a result, many
web applications will remain vulnerable while site-wide
HTTPS is being deployed, a process that is likely to
take several years. In this paper, we present One-Time
Cookies, a lightweight solution to session hijacking at-
tacks. By relying on a well-known cryptographic con-
struction such as hash chains, OTC creates disposable
authentication tokens that can not be reused, providing
more robust session integrity. While OTC does not pro-
vide data confidentiality and integrity (as HTTPS does),
it does provide for session integrity and prevents an ad-
versary from replaying authentication tokens to illicitly
navigate through an application. Our experimental eval-
uation showed that OTC is considerably more efficient
than HTTPS and has approximately the same perfor-
mance as current cookie-based mechanisms. In doing
so, we have provided a more secure, efficient and eas-
ier to deploy alternative for managing web sessions than
standard cookies.
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Appendix
Formal Verification using Proverif
In this section, we present the Horn Clause translation of the OTC protocol. This translation was used as input for Proverif to verify
that the secrecy of the next hash value (secretR[]) to be used and the session key (secretS[]) is guaranteed. The values
whose secrecy is to be verified, are given as queries to Proverif. If they are reachable, then secrecy is not guaranteed, while if
they are unreachable, secrecy is guaranteed.
Horn Clause Translation of OTC




















(* web browser *)









c:messageL(x, hmacL(x, secretS[])) ->
D:nonce[secretS[],i];
(* web server *)
c:messageR(uid(secretS[]), hash(secretR[]),
url, hmacR(secretS[], uid(secretS[]), url,




ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable c:secretR[]
ok, secrecy assumption verified:
fact unreachable c:secretS[]
RESULT goal unreachable: c:secretR[]
RESULT goal unreachable: c:secretS[]
